Abstract. We study unconditionally secure 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer (1-2 OT). We first point out that a standard security requirement for 1-2 OT of bits, namely that the receiver only learns one of the bits sent, holds if and only if the receiver has no information on the XOR of the two bits. We then generalize this to 1-2 OT of strings and show that the security can be characterized in terms of binary linear functions. More precisely, we show that the receiver learns only one of the two strings sent if and only if he has no information on the result of applying any binary linear function (which non-trivially depends on both inputs) to the two strings.
Introduction
1-2 Oblivious-Transfer, 1-2 OT for short, is a two-party primitive which allows a sender to send two bits (or, more generally, strings) B 0 and B 1 to a receiver, who is allowed to learn one of the two according his choice C. Informally, it is required that the receiver only learns B C but not B 1−C (obliviousness), while at the same time the sender does not learn C (privacy). 1-2 OT was introduced in [28] (under the name of "multiplexing") in the context of quantum cryptography, and, inspired by [25] where a different flavor was introduced, later re-discovered in [19] .
1-2 OT turned out to be very powerful in that it was shown to be sufficient for secure general two-party computation [22] . On the other hand, it is quite easy to see that unconditionally secure 1-2 OT is not possible without any assumption. Even with the help of quantum communication and computation, unconditionally secure 1-2 OT remains impossible [23, 24] . As a consequence, much effort has been put into constructing unconditionally secure protocols for 1-2 OT using physical assumptions like (various models for) noisy channels [8, 16, 12, 9] , or a memory bounded adversary [6, 17, 18] . Similarly, much effort has been put into reducing 1-2 OT to (seemingly) weaker flavors of OT, like Rabin OT, 1-2 XOT, etc. [7, 3, 5, 29, 4, 10] .
In this work, we focus on a slightly modified notion of 1-2 OT, which we call Randomized 1-2 OT, Rand 1-2 OT for short, where the bits (or strings) B 0 and B 1 are not input by the sender, but generated uniformly at random during the Rand 1-2 OT and then output to the sender. It is still required that the receiver only learns the bit (or string) of his choice, B C , whereas the sender does not learn any information on C. It is obvious that a Rand 1-2 OT can easily be turned into an ordinary 1-2 OT simply by using the generated B 0 and B 1 to mask the actual input bits (or strings). Furthermore, all known constructions of unconditionally secure 1-2 OT protocols make (implicitly) the detour via a Rand 1-2 OT.
In a first step, we observe that the obliviousness condition of a Rand 1-2 OT of bits is equivalent to requiring the XOR B 0 ⊕ B 1 to be (close to) uniformly distributed from the receiver's point of view. The proof is very simple, and it is kind of surprising that (to the best of our knowledge) this has not been realized before. We then ask and answer the question whether there is a natural generalization of this result to Rand 1-2 OT of strings. Note that requiring the bitwise XOR of the two strings to be uniformly distributed is obviously not sufficient. We show that the obliviousness condition for Rand 1-2 OT of strings can be characterized in terms of non-degenerate linear functions (bivariate binary linear functions which non-trivially depend on both arguments, as defined in Definition 2): obliviousness holds if and only if the result of applying any nondegenerate linear function to the two strings is (close to) uniformly distributed from the receiver's point of view.
We then show the usefulness of this new understanding of 1-2 OT. We demonstrate this on the problem of reducing 1-2 OT to weaker primitives. Concretely, we show that the reducibility of an (ordinary) 1-2 OT to weaker flavors via a non-interactive reduction follows by a trivial argument from our characterization of the obliviousness condition. This is in sharp contrast to the current literature: The proofs given in [3, 29, 4] for reducing 1-2 OT to 1-2 XOT, 1-2 GOT and 1-2 UOT (we refer to Section 5 for a description of these flavors of OT) are rather complicated and tailored to a particular class of privacy-amplifying hash functions; whether the reductions also work for a less restricted class is left as an open problem [4, page 222] . And, the proof given in [5] for reducing 1-2 OT to one execution of a general UOT is not only complicated, but also incorrect, as we will point out. Thus, our characterization of the obliviousness condition allows to simplify existing reducibility proofs (and, along the way, to solve the open problem posed in [4] , as well as to improve the reduction parameters in most cases), but it also allows for new (respectively until now only incorrectly proven) reductions. Furthermore, our techniques are useful for the construction and analysis of 1-2 OT protocols in other settings, for instance in the bounded quantum-storage model [13] .
Notation
Let P and Q be two probability distributions over the same domain X . The variational distance δ P, Q is defined as δ P, Q : =
Note that this definition makes sense also for non-normalized distributions, and indeed we define and use δ P, Q for arbitrary positive-valued functions P and Q with common domain. In case X is of the form X = U × V, we can expand
. We write P ≈ ε Q to denote that P and Q are ε-close, i.e., that δ P, Q ≤ ε.
For a random variable X it is common to denote its distribution by P X . We adopt this notation. Alternatively, we also write [X] for the distribution P X of X. For two random variables X and Y , whereas [X Y ] naturally denotes the joint distribution P XY , we write [X] [Y ] to denote the independent distribution P XY : (x, y) → P X (x)P Y (y). Using this notation, X and Y are (close to) independent if and only if
. We feel that this notation is sometimes easier to read as it refrains from putting the crucial information into the subscript.
By unif we denote a uniformly distributed binary random variable (independent of anything else), such that P unif (b) = 1 2 for both b ∈ {0, 1}, and unif stands for independent copies of unif.
Defining 1-2 OT

(Randomized) 1-2 OT of Bits
Formally capturing the intuitive understanding of the security of 1-2 OT is a non-trivial task. We adopt the security definition of [11] , where it is argued that this definition is the "right" way to define unconditionally secure 1-2 OT. In their model, a secure 1-2 OT protocol is as good as an ideal 1-2 OT functionality.
In this paper, we will mainly focus on a slight modification of 1-2 OT, which we call Randomized 1-2 OT (although Sender-randomized 1-2 OT would be a more appropriate, but also rather lengthy name). A Randomized 1-2 OT, or Rand 1-2 OT for short, essentially coincides with an (ordinary) 1-2 OT, except that the two bits B 0 and B 1 are not input by the sender but generated uniformly at random during the protocol and output to the sender. This is formalized in Definition 1 below.
There are two main justifications for focusing on Rand 1-2 OT. First, an ordinary 1-2 OT can easily be constructed from a Rand 1-2 OT: the sender can use the randomly generated B 0 and B 1 to one-time-pad encrypt his input bits for the 1-2 OT, and send the masked bits to the receiver (as first realized in [1] ). For a formal proof of this we refer to the full version of [11] .
1 And second, all information-theoretically secure constructions of 1-2 OT protocols we are aware of in fact do implicitly build a Rand 1-2 OT and use the above reduction to achieve 1-2 OT.
We formalize Rand 1-2 OT in such a way that it minimizes and simplifies as much as possible the security restraints, while at the same time remaining sufficient for 1-2 OT. 1-2 OT) . An ε-secure Rand 1-2 OT is a protocol between sender S and receiver R, with R having input C ∈ {0, 1} (while S has no input), such that for any distribution of C, the following properties hold: ε-Correctness: For honest S and R, S has output B 0 , B 1 ∈ {0, 1} and R has output B C , except with probability ε. 
Definition 1 (Rand
ε-Privacy: For honest R and any (dishonest)S with output
The privacy condition simply says thatS learns no information on C, and obliviousness requires that there exists a choice bit D (supposed to be C) such that when given the choice bit D and the corresponding bit B D , then the other bit B 1−D is independent and random fromR's point of view.
(Randomized) 1-2 OT of Strings
In a 1-2 String OT the sender inputs two strings (of the same length), and the receiver is allowed to learn one of the two and only one of the two. Formally, for any positive integer , 
Characterizing Obliviousness
The Case of Bit OT
It is well known (and it follows from the obliviousness condition) that in a (Rand) 1-2 OT the receiver R should in particular learn (essentially) no information on the XOR B 0 ⊕ B 1 of the two bits. The following proposition shows that this is not only necessary for the obliviousness condition but also sufficient. Before going into the proof (which is surprisingly simple), consider the following example. Assume a candidate protocol for Rand 1-2 OT and a dishonest receiver R which is able to output
and W = 0 or 1 with probability 1/2 each in case B 0 = B 1 . Then, it is easy to see that conditioned on, say, W = 0, (B 0 , B 1 ) is (0, 0) with probability 1 2 , and (0, 1) and (1, 0) each with probability 1 4 , such that the condition on the XOR from Theorem 1 is satisfied. On the other hand, neither B 0 nor B 1 is uniformly distributed (conditioned on W = 0), and it appears as if the receiver has some joint information on B 0 and B 1 which is forbidden by a (Rand) 1-2 OT. But that is not so. Indeed, the same view can be obtained when attacking an ideal Rand 1-2 OT: submit a random bit C to obtain B C and output W = B C . And in the light of Definition 1, if W = 0 we can split the event (B 0 , B 1 ) = (0, 0) into two disjoint subsets (subevents) E 0 and E 1 such that each has probability Proof. The "only if" implication is well known and straightforward. For the "if" implication, we first argue the perfect case where
For any value w with P W (w) > 0, the non-normalized distribution P B0B1W (·, ·, w) can be expressed as depicted in the left table of Figure 1 , where we write a for P B0B1W (0, 0, w), b for P B0B1W (0, 1, w), c for P B0B1W (1, 0, w) and d for P B0B1W (1, 1, w) . Note that a+b+c+d = P W (w) and, by assumption, a+d = b+c. Due to symmetry, we may assume that a ≤ b. We can then define D by extending P B0B1W (·, ·, w) to P B0B1DW (·, ·, ·, w) as depicted in the right two tables in Figure 1 :
It is now obvious that
. This finishes the perfect case. Concerning the general case, the idea is the same as above, except that one has to take some care regarding the error parameter ε ≥ 0. As this does not give any new insight, and we anyway state and fully prove a more general result in Theorem 2, we skip this part of the proof.
The Case of String OT
The obvious question after the previous section is whether there is a natural generalization of Theorem 1 to 1-2 OT for ≥ 2. Note that the straightforward generalization of the XOR-condition in Theorem 1, requiring that any receiver has no information on the bit-wise XOR of the two strings, is clearly too weak, and does not imply the obliviousness condition for Rand 1-2 OT : for instance the receiver could know the first half of the first string and the second half of the second string.
The Characterization. Let be an arbitrary positive integer.
if it is linear and non-trivially depends on both input strings.
In case = 1, the XOR is a NDLF, and it is the only NDLF. Based on this notion, the obliviousness condition of Rand 1-2 OT can be characterized as follows.
Theorem 2. The ε-obliviousness condition for a Rand 1-2 OT is satisfied for a particular (possibly dishonest) receiverR with output W if
for every NDLF β, and, on the other hand, the ε-obliviousness condition may be satisfied only if
Note that the number of NDLFs is exponential in , namely (2 − 1)
2 . Nevertheless, we show in Section 5 that this characterization turns out to be very useful. There, we will also argue that an exponential overhead (in ) in the sufficient condition is unavoidable. The proof of Theorem 2 also shows that the set of NDLFs forms a minimal set of functions among all sets that imply obliviousness. In this sense, our characterization is tight.
We would like to point out that Theorem 4 in [4] also provides a tool to analyze the obliviousness condition of 1-2 OT protocols in terms of linear functions; however, the condition that needs to be satisfied is much stronger than for our Theorem 2: it additionally requires that one of the two strings is a priori uniformly distributed (from the receiver's point of view). 4 This difference is crucial, because showing that one of the two strings is uniform (conditioned on the receiver's view) is usually technically involved and sometimes not even possible, as the example given after Theorem 1 shows. This is also demonstrated by the fact that the analysis in [4] of the considered 1-2 OT protocol is tailored to one particular class of privacy-amplifying hash functions, and it is stated as an open problem how to prove their construction secure when a different class of hash functions is used. The condition for Theorem 2, on the other hand, is naturally satisfied for typical constructions of 1-2 OT protocols, as we shall see in Section 5. As a result, Theorem 2 allows for much simpler and more elegant security proofs for 1-2 OT protocols, and, as a by-product, allows to solve the open problem from [4] . We explain this in detail in Section 5, and the interested reader may well jump ahead and save the proof of Theorem 2 for later.
The proof for the "only if" part of Theorem 2 is given in the full version of this paper [15] ; in fact, a slightly stronger statement is shown, namely that the ε-obliviousness condition implies [β(S 0 , S 1 )W ] ≈ ε [unif] [W ] for any 2-balanced function (as defined in [15] ). The "if" part, which is the interesting direction, is proven below. The Perfect Case: As the case = 1 is already settled, we assume that ≥ 2.
Proof of Theorem 2 ("if " part
Fix an arbitrary output w of the receiver, and consider the non-normalized probability distribution P S0S1W (·, ·, w). We use the variable p s0,s1 to refer to P S0S1W (s 0 , s 1 , w), and we write o for the all-zero string (0, . . . , 0) ∈ {0, 1} . We assume that p o,o ≤ p o,s1 for any s 1 ∈ {0, 1} ; we show later that we may do so. We extend this distribution to P S0S1DW (·, ·, ·, w) by setting
for any strings s 0 , s 1 ∈ {0, 1} , and we collect the equations resulting from the condition that P S0S1W (·, ·, w) = P S0S1DW (·, ·, 0, w) + P S0S1DW (·, ·, 1, w) needs to be satisfied: for any two s 0 , s 1 ∈ {0, 1} \ {o}
If all these equations do hold (for any w) then as in the case of = 1, the random variable D is well defined and for s 0 ∈ {0, 1} \ {o} and s 1 ∈ {0, 1} \ {t}. However, these equations follow from the equations given by (2): subtract equation (2) with s 1 replaced by t from equation (2) . Therefore, it suffices to focus on the equations given by (2) .
We proceed by showing that the equations provided by the assumed uniformity of β(S 0 , S 1 ) for any β imply the equations given by (2) . Consider an arbitrary pair a 0 , a 1 ∈ {0, 1} \ {o} and let β be the associated NDLF, i.e., such that β(s 0 , s 1 ) = a 0 , s 0 ⊕ a 1 , s 1 . By assumption, β(S 0 , S 1 ) is uniformly distributed, independent of W . Thus, for any fixed w, and writing p s0,s1 for P S0S1W (s 0 , s 1 , w), this can be expressed as
where both summations are over all σ 0 , σ 1 ∈ {0, 1} subject to the indicated respective properties. Recall, that this equality holds for any pair a 0 , a 1 ∈ {0, 1} \ {o}. Thus, for fixed s 0 , s 1 ∈ {0, 1} \ {o}, if we add up over all such pairs a 0 , a 1 subject to a 0 , s 0 = a 1 , s 1 = 1, we get the equation
We are now going to argue that, up to a constant multiplicative factor, equation (4) . Now, we argue that any other p σ0,σ1 equally often appears on the right and on the left hand side, and thus vanishes from the equation. Note that the set of pairs a 0 , a 1 , over which the summation runs on the left respectively the right hand side, can be understood as the set of solutions to a binary (non-homogeneous) linear equations system: ⎛
Also note that the two linear equation systems consist of three equations and involve at least 4 variables (as a 0 , a 1 ∈ {0, 1} and ≥ 2). Therefore, using basic linear algebra, one is tempted to conclude that they both have solutions, and, because they have the same homogeneous part, they have the same number of solutions (equal to the number of homogeneous solutions). However, this is only guaranteed if the matrix defining the homogeneous part has full rank. 
Since (2) only holds approximately, P S0S1DW as in (1) is not necessarily a valid extension, but close. This can obviously be overcome by instead setting
with suitably chosen δ s0,s1 , δ s0,s1 ≥ 0 with δ s0,s1 + δ s0,s1 = δ s0,s1 , and with suitably chosen signs "+" or "−".
5 Using that every P S0S1DW (s 0 , s 1 , 0, w) differs from p s0,o by at most δ s0,s1 , it follows from a straightforward computation that δ P S1−D SDDW (·, ·, 0, w), P unif P SD DW (·, 0, w) ≤ s0,s1 δ s0,s1 . The corresponding holds for P S0S1DW (·, ·, 1, w). It follows that
which concludes the proof.
Applications
In this section we will show the usefulness of Theorem 2 for the construction of 1-2 OT , based on weaker primitives (like a noisy channel, a quantum uncertainty relation or other flavors of OT). In particular, we will show that the reducibility of 1-2 OT to any weaker flavor of OT follows as a simple argument using Theorem 2.
Reducing 1-2 OT to Independent Repetitions of Weak 1-2 OT's
Background. A great deal of effort has been put into constructing protocols for 1-2 OT based on physical assumptions like (various models for) noisy channels [8, 16, 12, 9] or a memory bounded adversary [6, 17, 18] , as well as into reducing 1-2 OT to (seemingly) weaker flavors of OT, like Rabin OT, 1-2 XOT, 1-2 GOT and 1-2 UOT [7, 3, 5, 29, 4, 10] . Note that the latter three flavors of OT are weaker than 1-2 OT in that the (dishonest) receiver has more freedom in choosing the sort of information he wants to get about the sender's input bits B 0 and B 1 :  B 0 , B 1 or B 0 ⊕ B 1 in case of 1-2 XOT, g(B 0 , B 1 ) for an arbitrary one-bit-output function g in case of 1-2 GOT, and an arbitrary (probabilistic) Y with mutual information I(B 0 B 1 ; Y ) ≤ 1 in case of 1-2 UOT. 6 All these reductions of 1-2 OT to weaker versions follow a specific construction design (which is also at the core of the 1-2 OT protocols based on noisy channels or a memory-bounded adversary). By repeated (independent) executions of the underlying primitive, S transfers a randomly chosen bit string X = (X 0 , X 1 ) ∈ {0, 1} n × {0, 1} n to R such that: (1) depending on his choice bit C, the honest R knows either X 0 or X 1 , (2) anyS has no information on which part of X R learned, and (3) anyR has some uncertainty in X. Then, this is completed to a Rand 1-2 OT by means of privacy amplification [2] : S samples two functions f 0 and f 1 from a universal-two class F of hash functions, sends them to R, and outputs S 0 = f 0 (X 0 ) and S 1 = f 1 (X 1 ), and R outputs S C = f C (X C ). Finally, the Rand 1-2 OT is transformed into an ordinary 1-2 OT in the obvious way.
Correctness and privacy of this construction are clear, they follow immediately from (1) and (2) . How easy or hard it is to prove obliviousness depends heavily on the underlying primitive. In case of Rabin OT it is rather straightforward. In case of 1-2 XOT and the other weaker versions, this is non-trivial. The problem is that since R might know X 0 ⊕ X 1 , it is not possible to argue that there exists d ∈ {0, 1} such that R's uncertainty on X 1−d is large when given X d . This, though, would be necessary in order to finish the proof by simply applying the privacy amplification theorem [2] . This difficulty is overcome in [3, 4] by tailoring the proof to a particular universal-two class of hash functions (namely the class of all linear hash functions). Whether the reduction also works for a less restricted class of hash functions is left in [3, 4] as an open problem, which we solve here as a side result. Using a smaller class of hash functions would allow for instance to reduce the communication complexity of the protocol.
In [10] , the difficulty is overcome by giving up on the simplicity of the reduction. The cost of two-way communication allowing for interactive hashing is traded for better reduction parameters. We would like to emphasize that these parameters are incomparable to ours, because a different reduction is used, whereas our approach provides a better analysis of the non-interactive reductions.
The New Approach. We argue that, independent of the underlying primitive, obliviousness follows as a simple consequence of Theorem 2, in combination with a straightforward observation regarding the composition of NDLFs with strongly universal-two hash functions (Proposition 1 below). Recall that a class F of hash functions from, say, {0, 1} n to {0, 1} is strongly universal-two [27] if for any distinct x, x ∈ {0, 1} n the two random variables F (x) and F (x ) are independent and uniformly distributed (over {0, 1} ), where the random variable F represents the random choice of a function in F . 
Proposition 1. Let
The proof is straightforward; for completeness, it is given in the full version [15] . 7 Now, briefly, obliviousness for a construction as sketched above can be argued as follows. The only restriction is that F needs to be strongly universal-two. From the independent repetitions of the underlying weak OT (Rabin OT, 1-2 XOT, 1-2 GOT or 1-2 UOT) it follows thatR has "high" collision entropy in X. Hence, for any NDLF β, we can apply the privacy amplification theorem [2] (respectively the version given in Appendix A) to the (strongly) universal-two hash function β(f 0 (·), f 1 (·)) and argue that β(f 0 (X 0 ), f 1 (X 1 )) is close to uniform for randomly chosen f 0 and f 1 . Obliviousness then follows immediately from Theorem 2.
We save the quantitative analysis (Theorem 3) for next section, where we consider a reduction of 1-2 OT to the weakest kind of OT: to one execution of a UOT. Based on this, we compare in Appendix B the quality of the analysis of the above reductions based on Theorem 2 with the results in [4] . It turns out that our analysis is tighter for 1-2 GOT and 1-2 UOT, whereas the analysis in [4] is tighter for 1-2 XOT; but in all cases, our analysis is much simpler and, we believe, more elegant.
Reducing 1-2 OT to One Execution of UOT
We assume the reader to be somewhat familiar with the notion of Renyi entropy H α of order α. Definition and some elementary properties needed in this section are given in Appendix A. We also refer to Appendix A for the slightly nonstandard notion of average conditional Renyi entropy H α (X|Y ) we are using.
Universal Oblivious Transfer. Probably the weakest flavor of OT is the Universal OT (UOT) as it was introduced in [5] , in that it gives the receiver the most freedom in getting information on the string X. Formally, for a finite set X and parameters α ≥ 0 (allowing α = ∞) and r > 0, an (α, r)-UOT(X ) works as follows. The sender inputs x ∈ X , and the receiver may choose an arbitrary conditional probability distribution P Y |X with the only restriction that for a uniformly distributed X it must satisfy H α (X|Y ) ≥ r. 8 The receiver then gets as output y, sampled according to the distribution P Y |X (·|x), whereas the sender gets no information on the receiver's choice for P Y |X . Note that a 1-2 UOT is a special case of this kind of UOT since "1-2 UOT = (1, 1)-UOT({0, 1}
2 )". The crucial property of such an UOT is that the input is not restricted to two bits, but may be two bit-strings; this potentially allows to reduce 1-2 OT to one execution of a UOT, rather than to many independent executions of the same primitive as for the 1-2 flavors of OT mentioned above. Indeed, following the design principle discussed in Section 5.1, it is straightforward to come up with a candidate protocol for 1-2 OT which uses one execution of a (α, r)-UOT(X ) with X = {0, 1}
n × {0, 1} n . The protocol is given in Figure 2 , where F is a (strongly) universal-two class of hash functions from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} .
OT2UOT (c):
, and as a result R obtains y = xc. 2. S samples independent random f0, f1 ∈ F, sends f0 and f1 to R, and outputs s0 = f0(x0) and s1 = f1(x1). 3. R computes and outputs sc = fc(y).
Fig. 2. Protocol OT2UOT for Rand1-2 OT
In [5] it is claimed that, for appropriate parameters, protocol OT2UOT is a secure Rand 1-2 OT (respectively, the resulting protocol for 1-2 OT is secure). However, we argue below that the proof given is not correct (and it is not obvious how to fix it). In Theorem 3 we then show that its security follows easily from Theorem 2.
A Flaw in the Security Proof. In [5] the security of protocol OT2UOT is argued as follows. Using (rather complicated) spoiling-knowledge techniques, it is shown that, conditioned on the receiver's output (which we suppress to simplify the notation) at least one out of H ∞ (X 0 ) and H ∞ (X 1 |X 0 = x 0 ) is "large" (for any x 0 ), and, similarly, at least one out of H ∞ (X 1 ) and H ∞ (X 0 |X 1 = x 1 ). Since collision entropy is lower bounded by min-entropy, it then follows from the privacy amplification theorem that at least one out of H(F 0 (X 0 )|F 0 ) and H(F 1 (X 1 )|F 1 , X 0 = x 0 ) is close to , and similarly, one out of H(F 1 (X 1 )|F 1 ) and H(F 0 (X 0 )|F 0 , X 1 = x 1 ). It is then claimed that this proves OT2UOT secure.
We argue that this very last implication is not correct. Indeed, what is proven about the entropy of F 0 (X 0 ) and F 1 (X 1 ) does not exclude the possibility that both entropies H(F 0 (X 0 )|F 0 ) and H(F 1 (X 1 )|F 1 ) are maximal, but that H(F 0 (X 0 ) ⊕ F 1 (X 1 )|F 0 , F 1 ) = 0. This would allow the receiver to learn the (bitwise) XOR S 0 ⊕ S 1 , which is clearly forbidden by the obliviousness condition.
Also note that the proof does not use the fact that the two functions F 0 and F 1 are chosen independently. However, if they are chosen to be the same, then the protocol is clearly insecure: if the receiver asks for Y = X 0 ⊕ X 1 , and if F is a class of linear universal-two hash functions, thenR obviously learns S 0 ⊕ S 1 .
Reducing 1-2 OT to UOT. The following theorem guarantees the security of OT2UOT (for an appropriate choice of the parameters). The only restriction we have to make is that F needs to be a strongly universal-two class of hash function.
Theorem 3. Let F be a strongly universal-two class of hash functions from
2n ) with n ≥ r ≥ 4 + 3κ + 4.
Using the bounds from Lemma 2 (in Appendix A) on the different orders of Renyi entropy, the reducibility of 1-2 OT to (α, r)-UOT(X ) follows immediately for any α > 1. Informally, obliviousness for protocol OT2UOT is argued as for the reduction of 1-2 OT to Rabin OT, 1-2 XOT etc., discussed in Section 5.1, simply by using Proposition 1 in combination with the privacy amplification theorem, and applying Theorem 2. The formal proof given in Appendix C additionally keeps track of the "error term". From this proof it also becomes clear that the exponential (in ) overhead in Theorem 2 is unavoidable. Indeed, a sub-exponential overhead would allow in Theorem 3 to be super-linear (in n), which of course is nonsense.
Generalizations and Further Applications
The general technique described in this section also comes in handy in a quantum setting. The fact that we do not need to know how the entropy is distributed over X is fundamental to prove secure a protocol for 1-2 OT in the bounded quantum-storage model as introduced in [14] . In upcoming work [13] , we present a protocol for Rand 1-2 OT for which we can use a quantum uncertainty relation to show a lower bound on the min-entropy of the 2n-bit string X transmitted by the sender using a quantum encoding. We prove a quantum version of Theorem 2 which enables us to use the result about privacy amplification against quantum adversaries [26] to conclude that our protocol is oblivious against adversaries with bounded quantum memory. This application motivates further the use of (strongly) universal-two hashing, because up to date, no other means of privacy amplification have been shown secure against quantum adversaries.
In [15] , we show that it is also possible to generalize Theorem 2 to 1-n OT: it then states that the condition for Rand 1-n OT is satisfied if for any NDLF β and for any 0 ≤ i < j ≤ n − 1 it holds that β(S i , S i ) is (essentially) uniform, conditioned on the receiver's output W and on all S k with k = i, j. This comes in handy for the construction and analysis of 1-n OT schemes, as demonstrated in [13] , where also 1-n OT schemes in the bounded quantum-storage model are considered.
Conclusion
We have established a characterization of the obliviousness condition for (a slightly modified version of) 1-2 OT (Theorem 2). Using this characterization in combination with a composition result about strongly universal-two hash functions (Proposition 1), it follows by a very simple argument that when starting with a 2n-bit string X with enough (collision) entropy, arbitrarily splitting up X into two n-bit strings X 0 , X 1 followed by strongly universal-two hashing yields obliviousness as required by a 1-2 OT. This allows for easy analyses whenever this design principle is used or can be applied, like reductions of 1-2 OT to weaker flavors, or 1-2 OT in the bounded (quantum) storage model, but possibly also in other contexts like in a computational setting when unconditional obliviousness is required.
A (Conditional) Renyi Entropy
Let α ≥ 0, α = 1. The Renyi entropy of order α of a random variable X with distribution P X is defined as
The limit for α → 1 is the Shannon entropy H(X)= − log x P X (x) log P X (x) and the limit for α → ∞ the min-entropy H ∞ (X) = − log max x P X (x) . Another important special case is the case α = 2, also known as collision entropy H 2 (X) = − log x P X (x) 2 . The conditional Renyi entropy H α (X|Y = y) for two random variables X and Y is naturally defined as H α (X|Y = y) = 1 1−α log x P X|Y (x|y) α . Furthermore, in the literature H α (X|Y ) is often defined as y P Y (y) H α (X|Y = y), like for Shannon entropy. However, for our purpose, a slightly different definition will be useful. For 1 < α < ∞, we define the average conditional Renyi entropy H α (X|Y ) as
and as H ∞ (X|Y ) = − log y P Y (y) max x P X|Y (x|y) for α = ∞. This notion is useful in particular because it has the property that if the average conditional Renyi entropy is large, then the conditional Renyi entropy is large with high probability: Lemma 1. Let α > 1 (allowing α = ∞) and t ≥ 0. Then with probability at least 1 − 2 −t (over the choice of y) H α (X|Y = y) ≥ H α (X|Y ) − t.
The proof is straightforward and thus omitted. The following lemma follows from well known properties of the Renyi entropy which are easily seen to translate to the average conditional Renyi entropy.
Lemma 2. For any 1 < α < ∞:
α H α (X|Y ). Finally, our notion of average conditional Renyi entropy is such that the privacy amplification theorem of [2] still provides a lower bound on the average conditional collision entropy as we define it (as can easily be seen from the proof given in [2] ). However, for us it is convenient to express the smoothness in terms of variational distance rather than entropy, as in [21, 20] : 
B Quantitative Comparison
We compare the simple reduction of 1-2 OT to n executions of 1-2 XOT, 1-2 GOT and 1-2 UOT, respectively, using our analysis based on Theorem 2 as discussed in Section 5.1 (together with the quantitative statement given in Theorem 3), with the results achieved in [4] . 9 The quality of (the analysis of) a reduction is given by the reduction parameters c len , c sec and c const such that the 1-2 OT is guaranteed to be 2 −κ -secure as long as n ≥ c len · + c sec · κ + c const . The smaller these constants are, the better is the (analysis of the) reduction. The comparison of these parameters is given in Figure 3 (we focus on c len and c sec since c const is not really relevant, unless very large).
(with p e as above), and thus his average conditional min-entropy, which lower bounds the collision entropy, is at least − log(1 − p e ) ≈ 0.3. c len and c sec are then computed as c len ≈ 4/0.3 and c sec ≈ 3/0.3.
C Proof of Theorem 3
Define the event E = {y : H 2 (X|Y = y) ≥ H 2 (X|Y ) − κ − 1}. By Lemma 1 P [E] ≥ 1 − 2 −κ−1 . We will show below that conditioned on E, the obliviousness condition of Definition 1 holds with "error term" 2 Obliviousness as claimed now follows from Theorem 2.
